The changing nature of security in the Middle East since 1989

The end of the Cold War marked by the tearing down of the Berlin Wall is regarded as a seminal event in International Relations and had considerable implications throughout the world. One region in particular, the Middle East, will be the focus of this essay as we examine the changing nature of security there since 1989 and which has been marked by three key phases. Firstly, I will argue that a dangerous imbalance in power and capabilities, maintained precariously throughout the Cold War was altered drastically following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The period following the Iraq invasion was marked by the entry of the United States as the main power broker in the region, an influence it used to impose it's own (and to some extent Israel's) vision of a peace process. This led to a period of increased instability, the rise of religious extremism and the increase in the phenomenon of suicide bombings, this period is particularly marked by a re-evaluation of allegiances and priorities by the various countries. The abandonment of individual countries of the frail notion of “Arabism” which had united them reinforced ideas of game theory and Rousseau’s Stag Hunt scenario[1]. The third phase took effect following the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. In this phase, the collapse of Iraq into instability, prompted by the Bush administrations policy of attempting regime change in the region, prompted a number of countries and actors, (Syria, Iran, Hezbullah and Hamas) to “balance” against the United States. Up until this point, the overall tendency for most countries with regards to Iraq had been to “bandwagon” in the words of Waltz[2], with the superpower. However, when the regimes felt themselves threatened, they mostly had to rely on their own abilities and impose a strategic balance of sorts[3]. The results are now visible in the Iraqi quagmire which has humbled the world's only superpower and, in last years conflict in the South of Lebanon, with the tactical defeat of Israel's army by Hezbullah. Our area of analysis, the Middle East, is a vague geographical term encompassing a number of countries, but for this essay we will restrict this to the region which encompasses Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, the Arab Gulf states, Egypt and what is now referred to as Israel by some.



Before we begin however, a word on the scope of the essay. In a region such as we are examining, there is no shortage of information, opinions or events which are constantly emerging. As such, this examination is limited to an analysis of broad currents and trends operating at, but not exclusively to, the state level. The non-state actors we do refer to operate with the support and blessing of various state actors within the region, and their actions are thus interpreted within that context, apart from the notable exception of al-Qaeda. Secondly, security itself is a vague notion which is highly debatable and as such, it’s understanding in this essay is rooted in what is arguably the clearest and most powerful form, the neo-Realist state centered approach.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 marked a major security watershed in the region. As Barnett pointed out in 1998, it exposed the fragile reality of Arab unity and it's rhetoric[4]. It also marked a first for the Arab countries in that one had directly invaded the territory of another, destroying notions of Arab solidarity and unity, while at the same time, marking the beginning of “outsider” interference in the region on a more direct level[5]. Prior to the invasion, the late Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, had warned of a dangerous imbalance in the region with the strengthening of the “Zionist state” at the expense of the Arabs. The collapse of the Soviet Union was also marked by a dramatic increase in Russian Jews emigrating to Israel[6]. Now that the United States was the world's only superpower, he stated, the Arabs (because of their oil), were a target for domination[7]. Whatever his motives for the invasion of Kuwait, his actions meant that “any notions of Arab collective security lay in ruins” as Barnett puts it[8]. At the time, some argued that the invasion of Kuwait had given a pretext for those in the United States' security and defense establishment to justify high defense expenditure[9], however, according to Hadar, the principle purpose of intervention lay mostly in two other factors, the oil rich and hence strategic nature of the threatened Gulf states, and the influence of Israel, the United States' principal ally in the region[10]. This notion was echoed almost a decade later in a controversial paper by Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer on the role of the pro-Israel lobby in influencing United States foreign policy[11]. The absence of the Soviet Union on the Middle Eastern arena, according to them, meant a shift in the involvement of the United States from that of “off-shore balancer” to one of “dual containment”[12]. While the US had initially supported various “regional clients” against each other (“off-shore balancing”), this involvement declined as events such as the end of the Cold War, or in Iraq's case, the Iran/Iraq war, minimised their strategic value[13]. For Iraq, the defeat marked the start of a long process of decline accelerated by harsh economic sanctions and frequent coalition air strikes on Iraqi infrastructure leading to the gradual fragmentation of the Iraqi state[14]. That the United States wished to impose a new order on the Middle East was no secret, and influences within and close to the government machinery were to exert a continuous pressure until the 2003 invasion of Iraq which marked the culmination. As Mearsheimer and Waltz put it:

“...the Israeli government and pro-Israel groups in the United States wanted together to shape the Bush administrations' policy towards Iraq, Syria and Iran, as well as it's grand scheme for reordering the Middle East”[15].

This embroilment of the world's only superpower in the conflicts of the region served to strengthen Israel's power in the region and forced the various Arab regimes in the region to adapt to new realities. The defeat of Iraq by a broad US-led coalition highlighted the severity of the cracks that had appeared in the security configuration of the Middle East, previously glossed over by the Cold War dichotomy. In addition, the various Arab countries that agreed to join the coalition against Saddam each had their own reasons for doing so, and notions of Pan-Arabism were not on the agenda. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan each supported the invasion in various ways and for their own reasons at the expense of Iraq, from whom they were threatened on a diplomatic, economic and military level[16]. For Syria, the chance arose to ingratiate herself with the new regional hegemon, and this was rewarded by the free hand given to it in Lebanon and renewed hopes of an agreement with Israel concerning the occupied Syrian Golan Heights[17]. Barnett, in 1998, questioned whether it was possible to talk of an end to “Arab politics”, centered around notions of unity and resisting Israeli occupation[18], following the end of the Gulf War. In the end, the Israeli position in the Middle East did indeed become much stronger at the expense of the Arab states and this was to equate to greater leverage on the negotiating table. As Bush Snr. put it, “there can be no substitute for diplomacy” in this new American dominated Middle East. Liberal theories of international relations were to be imposed on the countries of the Middle East under a powerful and unchallenged American hegemony. True to neo-realist game theory, the various countries had indeed sought out their individual interests at the expense of Iraq. To utilise Rousseau's 'Stag Hunt' scenario, the Stag which was Israel was abandoned as the different hunters first one, then the other, settled with an individual hare, leaving the majority hungry[19].

The Arab-Israeli conflict had been simmering throughout the twentieth century since the loss of Palestine to migrant Jewish Zionists in 1948. The defeat of Iraq in 1991, and the rise of the United States and Israel to dominate the Middle East, made possible a drastic realignment of allegiances and positions in the region[20]. As Bush Snr. had promised, diplomacy sponsored by the United States was to be the proverbial name of the game, though the Oslo accords of 1993 allegedly took place without US knowledge[21], still, this may have been more likely due to the precarious position the Palestinian Liberation Organisation found itself in following the war[22] and would have significantly altered their bargaining capacity. In September 13th 1993 the PLO and Israel signed a “Declaration of Principles”; in 1991 an Arab-Israeli conference took place in Madrid; then, in 1994, King Hussein of Jordan signed his country's peace deal with Israel[23]. A final settlement seemed within reach and countries such as Syria, Lebanon and Iran appeared to be increasingly isolated with their bargaining power steadily decreasing[24]. The optimism which surrounded the various peace deals turned out to be short-lived however, as it became quickly apparent that the agreements were heavily weighted towards Israel with little tangible benefits for the Palestinians[25]. One critic, the late Edward Said, argued at the time that as a result of the various peace agreements, “Israel's position is not only stronger but also essentially unchallenged”[26]. The deal was actually unpopular on both sides, though for different reasons, and in 1995 the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had been assassinated by a Jewish religious extremist intent on stopping the 'peace process'. By 1996 there was open conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis, with tensions aided by the election of the hard-line Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister[27].

This “American Peace Process”, as dubbed by Said, was driven by a now dominant United States that had it's foreign policy directed mainly by individuals with strong links to pro-Israel lobbies[28]. Should any Arab countries think of opposing this, the harsh sanctions against Iraq served as a “living reminder of daring to defy the United States”[29]. Outrage at this perceived submission to the will of Washington and Tel Aviv by what were considered to be terminally ill Arab governments led to widespread dissatisfaction with the existing political structures. As one Israeli intellectual noted “..the question was no longer whether Oslo had brought peace to the torn land of Israel and Palestine, but rather what price its people had paid for illusions sold to them by shortsighted politicians”[30]. For many, the disillusionment with secular governments only accelerated the rising influence of movements inspired by “Political Islam”. In the Occupied Territories, the use of suicide bombers as a strategic weapon by some of these movements increased dramatically, while the presence of US troops in the Gulf became one of the chief grievances of Osama Bin Laden and what came to be known as al-Qaeda. The “fatuous solemnity” of Bill Clinton as described by Edward Said, reconciling two rivals amidst the “typical American pageantry of 'peace' “ as Pappe called it, was simply not enough to affect change in the Arab-Israeli conflict and ensure peace in the region. Nor could it convince the Palestinians that they had gained any benefit in such an agreement. Events were to show the failure of such shortsightedness with increasing ferocity throughout the nineties as the aura of American hegemony in the region eroded steadily.

If the Iraqi expulsion from Kuwait in 1991 was the starting point of a new understanding of security in the Middle East, then the US invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq in 2003 marked another major shift. The attacks on September 11th 2001 against the economic and military symbols of the United States triggered what came to be known as the Bush Doctrine. It focused on a number of issues mainly, the impact a state's political system would have on it's foreign policy; preventive war, unilaterally if need be; and an assertion of American “primacy”[31]throughout the world. The original justifications for invading Iraq have faded away, however a central tenet remained, that of the emphasis on regime change in the region and the forcible imposition of democratic forms of government. One could argue this was an aggressive implementation of the neo-liberal democratic peace theory[32]. While the United States had had no qualms in dealing with the existing regimes in the region following the 1991 Gulf War, now, in the new context of what has been called “The War on Terror”, this was no longer acceptable. As Tariq Ali points out, citing from Thomas Friedman, “an iron fisted regime” was needed back then to keep the country together[33], however, after the 11th of September 2001, the United States changed tack, with President Bush promising to “make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”[34]. Though evidence linking Iraq to terrorism was flimsy at best, as Walt and Mearsheimer pointed out earlier, influences by neo-conservatives and pro-Israel lobbies were instrumental in encouraging the invasion.

The 2006 Iraq Study Group highlighted the situation that the United States now found itself caught in within Iraq[35]. While the defeat of the remnants of Iraq's once powerful Baath regime under Saddam was rapid, resistance groups, violence by infiltrating al-Qaeda operatives and sectarian violence all undermined any US plans for a democratic Iraq. The threat of regime change had been implicitly aimed at Iran and Syria, something both governments found unacceptable. It was therefore in their interest that plans for a 'democratic' Iraq should not succeed and to a large extent, these plans have failed in part due to their influence. The plan called for including Syria and Iran in future talks, citing the need for using the various “incentives” and “disincentives” available[36]. The report was ignored by President Bush, who announced a troop increase and a more aggressive escalation in operations[37], which was to have little success. As Vali Nasr points out, the elimination of the Iraqi army as a bulwark to Iranian influence removed the last obstacle remaining; the invasion of “Iraq has strengthened Iran and weakened the United States”[38] a sentiment also voiced earlier by the Independent's Fisk[39]. Furthermore, the 2006 Israeli defeat in the south of Lebanon at the hands of Hezbullah in spite of significant damage to Lebanon's infrastructure only further highlighted the inability of the United States' and it's allies to militarily impose their will. The regional hegemon had hit an impasse which it could not easily overcome, by regional actors who had “balanced” against it and, till now, succeeded. It is unclear what impact the nuclear aspirations of Iran will have or how it's enemies would react to it’s continuation[40], but, as the Independent's Cockburn points out, the recent tit for tat kidnappings and capture of Iranian diplomats and British troops respectively marks the continuation of a long simmering tension[41] as it became clear where the new regional power points have begun emerging. The United States appears to have mounted an indirect offensive to pressure Iran on the nuclear issue as well as on regional matters. The region also appears to be heading to a fomented Shia/Sunni split as countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia bandwagon with the United States and it's allies, encouraged into a so-called “alliance of moderation”[42] in 2006 to counter the Iranian/Syrian alliance.

From all this we can deduce a number of things. Firstly, while it does appear the region remains tense, from a neo-realist perspective, some interesting points appear to be emerging. The imbalance of the region dangerously towards Israel as a result of the United States' bias had only served to increase tensions and to some extent fueled extremist religious fundamentalism and terrorism. This was to have world wide implications which none could have expected. However, the fact that the world's only superpower has effectively been strong armed in a violent and seemingly unending occupation in Iraq, along with the humiliating defeat of it's client state Israel last summer, seems to indicate they have reached an impasse. If Iran and it's allies are able to maintain their grip on the United States' pressure points, provided the realisation of this takes hold in government circles within Washington and Tel Aviv, the willingness to negotiate on terms more favourable to both sides could lead to a more acceptable security solution for the region. From this we can deduce that while the “balancers” of Syria and Iran know they cannot decisively defeat the United States and it's allies, they can make victory impossible for them.

In summary, we have examined three key phases in how the security configuration of the region altered dramatically following 1989. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq led to a period of unrivalled US dominance in the region, coupled with a much stronger Israeli position viz. the Arab states and Iran. The second phase involved the attempts at peace-building in the region, however, an “American Peace Process” proved a failure and provoked a campaign of violence and increased tensions. This continued up until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the attempts at imposing a new vision for the Middle East, again from an American viewpoint. However this time Iran and it’s allies, threatened by this new development, balanced the United States and effectively stalled it’s attempts. The nature of security in the region has altered from one dominated by a single regional power and it’s alliance, to one where weaker, smaller states have balanced together for their own interests when these have been threatened.

Footnotes

[1] Cited in Waltz, 2001: 167[2] Cited in Walt, 2006: 96-102[3] Walt, 2006: 96-102[4] Barnett, 1998: http://0-www.ciaonet.org.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/book/barnett/barnett07.html[5] Ibid.[6] Yapp, 1996: 500 (Approximately 500,000 had emigrated following the collapse of the Soviet Union up till 1995)[7] Quandt, 1990: 50[8] Barnett, 1998: http://0-www.ciaonet.org.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/book/barnett/barnett07.html[9] Hadar, 1990: http://0-www.ciaonet.org.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/wps/hal01/hal01.html[10] Ibid.[11] Mearsheimer & Walt, 2005: 29-33[12] Ibid. 34 (Containing both Iraq and Iran)[13] Marr, 2004: 223[14] Marr, 2004: 302[15] Mearsheimer & Walt, 2005: 29[16] Marr, 2004: 240[17] Yapp, 1996: 461-462[18] Barnett, 1998: http://0-www.ciaonet.org.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/book/barnett/barnett07.html[19] Cited in Waltz, 2001: 167-168[20] Ibid.[21] Yapp, 1996: 450[22] Pappe, 2004: 265-6 (The loss of Iraq as a backer for the movement and the alienation the groups' support for Iraq had cost it with the other Arab countries.)[23] Ibid.[24] Barnett, 1998: http://0-www.ciaonet.org.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/book/barnett/barnett07.html [25] Said, 1996: 8-9[26] Said, 1996: 87[27] Cornwell, 1996: 12[28] Said, 1996: 87-89[29] Ibid.[30] Pappe, 2004: 247[31] Jervis, 2005: 439[32] A liberal theory that democracies are less likely to resort to armed conflict to resolve their differences.[33] Ali, 2002: 142-3[34] Transcript of speech made by US President George W. Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”, 11th September 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html[35] Baker & Hamilton, 2006[36] Ibid. : 6[37] Fisk, 2007: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/fisk/article2144057.ece[38] Nasr, 2007: 40-41[39] Fisk, 2007: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/fisk/article2054595.ece[40] Dejevsky, 2007: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/article2204054.ece[41] Cockburn, 2007: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2387845.ece[42] Grice, 2006: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/article2087585.ece

Bibliography

Ali, T. (2002), The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity, Verso, London & New York

Baker, J.A. & Hamilton, L.H. (2006), The Iraq Study Group Report, US Institute of Peace, http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html

Buzan, B. (1991), People, States & Fear 2nd Edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Various

Jervis, R. (2005), “Explaining the Bush Doctrine”, in, Art, R.J. & Jervis, R. (eds.), International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues 7th Edition, Pearson Longman, Various

Marr, P. (2004), The Modern History of Iraq 2nd Edition, Westview Press (A Member of the Perseus Books Group), USA

Mearsheimer, J.J. & Walt, S.M. (2006), The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, Harvard University, USA

Pappe, I. (2004), A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, Cambridge University Press, Various

Walt, S.M. (2005), “Alliance: Balancing and Bandwagoning”, in, Art, R.J. & Jervis, R. (eds.), International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues 7th Edition, Pearson Longman, Various

Waltz, K. N. (2001), Man, the State and War, Columbia University Press, New York

Yapp, M.E. (1996), The Near East since the First World War: A History to 1995 2nd Edition, Longman, London & New York

Speeches

Transcript of speech made by US President George H.W. Bush, “Address before a joint session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf conflict”, 6th March 1991, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1991/91030600.html

Transcript of speech made by US President George W. Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”, 11th September 2001,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html

Journals and Newspapers

Barnett, M.N. (1998), Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order, Columbia International Affairs Online,
http://0-www.ciaonet.org.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/book/barnett/barnett07.html

Beeston, R. (1993), “Israelis and Palestinians bewail slow pace of peacemaking “, The Times, October 27th, http://0-web.lexis-nexis.com.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/professional/document?_m=eca8af05ebabed33ec70ea25fb72a88a&_docnum=6&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkSt&_md5=cb49b123436afb6be698a33587627034&StartMuseCookie=LNAUTH%3DLNAUTH-IP%3B+ipsession%3DipUUId%2525a4dc5a052cdb1b11db9e1e00000aac59%2525a3

Cockburn, P. (2007), “The disputed waters that have become a diplomatic battleground”, The Independent, March 24th, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2387845.ece

Cornwell, R. (1996), “US urges both sides to end the killing”, The Independent, September 27th, 12.

Dejevsky, M. (2007), “The Big Question- Does the US intend to attack Iran, or is it just sabre- rattling?”, The Independent, February 1st, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/article2204054.ece

Fisk, R. (2006), “The Roman Empire is Falling- So it turns to Syria and Iran”, The Independent, 7th December, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/fisk/article2054595.ece

Fisk, R. (2007), “Bush's New Strategy – The March of Folly”, The Independent, January 11th, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/fisk/article2144057.ece

Grice, A. (2006), “Blair calls for Middle East 'alliance of moderation'”, The Independent, December 20th, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/article2087585.ece

Hadar, L.T. (1990), The Rise of the Middle Eastern Bogey Man: Toward Post Cold War Interventionism”, The CATO institute, Foreign Policy Briefing No. 2, 5th Sept.,
http://0-www.ciaonet.org.emu.londonmet.ac.uk/wps/hal01/hal01.html

Nasr, V. (2007), “Who Wins in Iraq: Iran”, Foreign Policy, March/April, 40-41.

Quandt, W.B. (1990),”The Middle East in 1990”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70,no. 1, 49-69.

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Ilan Pappe, one of the few Israeli academics I hold in great esteem.

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Do you love me

I know I can get a bit grim on my blog with all the tales of woe coming out of the Middle East. So, to lighten the tone a bit, a little playback from wayback when life was perhaps a little bit simpler. Great how he has an Arabic song with English words, he almost gets away with it. Terrible, but very catchy. Enjoy!

(A bowl of Hummus for whoever can get me info on the singer or more songs!)

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Just a note for Skynews: Soldiers are "captured" not "kidnapped". You made that mistake last year and you're doing it again this year.

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Damascus trivia

Did you know why Burj al Roos (Tower of heads), Hay al Krad (Kurdish neighbourhood) and al Muhajreen (the migrants) are called so?

Well apparently, Burj al Roos got it's name after the infamous Timurlang sacked Damascus in 1400. All artisans were sent to Samarkand while the rest of the inhabitants were put to the sword. The area of Burj al Roos is where all their heads were piled into a tower.

Hay al Krad is called thus for being where the Kurdish soldiers of the Mamelukes were kept in barracks, while the name al Muhajreen was given to the area settled by refugees from Eastern Europe. These had been escaping ethnic cleansing by the advancing Christian Europeans who had begun pushing back the Ottoman empire.

If anybody knows any other tid-bits of information please feel free to share or at least correct me if I've said absolute rubbish!

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"Decolonizing the Mind"

Deadlines are fast approaching and as a result, my postings are going to become less frequent for the time being. Still, while reading for one essay, I came across an interesting article by Edward Said called "Decolonizing the Mind" (Al-Hayat, September 16, 1994) which I felt I had to share. Here are some excerpts which got me thinking:

"..there isn't a single specialized institute or university department in any of these [Arab] countries whose main object of study is Israel. Israel of course has several important institutions and departments that are full of experts on each Arab country."

"Over the years I have always been struck that Arab students coming to the West were either interested in getting a technical or professional degree in medicine, engineering, business and so on, or they were pursuing a degree in some aspect of Middle Eastern history, politics, sociology, literature. Very rarely did they come to Oxford or Harvard to study American or European history."

"This is a common pattern: to come all the way to the West in order to study your own country in the West, thus being further ghettoized."

These criticisms are applicable to myself as much as any other Arab student, and will certainly have an impact on whatever field of post-graduate study I finally decide upon. Why do we choose to be "ghettoized" in the words of Said? Is it some kind of self inflicted narcissism? Interesting points indeed.

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Dr Azmi Bishara

A big thank you to Sham from Decentering Damascus for introducing me to the writings of Dr. Azmi Bishara. This man has a fantastic mind and I thoroughly recommend you read his articles which are now available in one place. I'll be following his news closely in the future. Interestingly I almost had the opportunity to meet him once through some friends I knew, though I remember being vaguely uneasy about such a meeting. Unfortunately he had to cancel his trip to London, I think in 2004 [Samer I need to speak to your Dad NOW].

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"Mr Bolton, a controversial and blunt-speaking figure, said he was "damned proud of what we did" to prevent an early ceasefire. "

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"There are 4,000, yes, people who are -- well, not all of those 780 are actually Americans, but they're working for American companies or on behalf of the occupation. But, again, these are only people who are eligible for federal death benefits in the United States. Over 7,600 of them have been injured in Iraq. There are 100,000 private contractors in Iraq. We know from the Government Accountability Office that there are 48,000 employees of private military firms, mercenary companies operating in Iraq. 180 separate firms are registered operating in Iraq, Blackwater sort of being the industry leader. And they operate in a climate of total impunity. There is no effective law that governs these mercenary forces in Iraq."

If you are interested in seeing what a real mercenary website looks like click here.

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QANUN

My continued fascination with the Qanun has now led me to this cool clip on Youtube. I need to go to one of these concerts NOW!

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"He points out that some pollsters mess up things deliberately when asking the wrong question at the wrong time. He gave an example of a poll showed that Americans hated the Arabs in a high point right after 9/11: "do you ask a recently divorced women what do you think of men??" asks Zogby. He argues that questions need to be studied first, for instance, one should ask this women how does she feel about her brother, grandfather…."

Interesting review by Sham on a talk held by an experienced pollster in the US. It'll make me think twice about poll results before taking them for their face value

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Dodgy banadora

You know the feeling. Sainsbury's is crowded, everybody rushing home to get to work including yourself. You grab what you need, in and out, end of story.

This morning I was going to make a cheese and tomato sandwich. "Slice the bread, some Flora...put the cheese and now where are those tomatoes I bought yesterday? Ah! Here they are."

But what is this grinning at me from the kitchen counter, I inwardly grimace as the realisation sinks in...I've bought tomatoes from Israel.


In case you are wondering, I had my sandwich sans banadora. Why? Since I've already bought it? Hayk ana, Tayss ma bifham.

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"The government officially declared on Monday that last summer's war in Lebanon is officially a "war." "

Ok everyone, that's the end of that, it's been settled.

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Ikhtalat al Habel bil Nabel (Situation is a mess)

"MOST Iraqis believe life is better for them now than it was under Saddam Hussein, according to a British opinion poll published today.

The survey of more than 5,000 Iraqis found the majority optimistic despite their suffering in sectarian violence since the American-led invasion four years ago this week."

Without a hint of sarcasm, The Times article, published on the 18th of March, concludes with a quote from Margarett Becket, “There is no widespread violence in the four southern provinces and the fact that the picture is more complex than the stereotype usually portrayed is reflected in today’s poll,” .

I guess that means we can all relax and go home, it's not as bad as we thought.

PS. Does anybody know what an accurate translaton of Ikhtalat al Habel bil Nabel would be? The winner gets a bowl of Hummus. .

"No sooner had Saddam Hussein fallen than Iraqis were left in no doubt that they had been occupied not liberated. The army and security services were dissolved. As an independent state Iraq ceased to exist. "The Americans want clients not allies in Iraq," lamented one Iraqi dissident who had long lobbied for the invasion in London and Washington."

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Maybe chop some onions...

I've had a bit of a religious tone to the blog this week and this posting won't be any different. Still, if I didn't feel it was helpful and interesting to have on then I wouldn't have put it. I met somebody quite learned in religion this evening with whom I've had quite an interesting discussion about religion and his views on secular politics. Here is one bit in particular that I thought quite novel.

Q: There seem to be so many different interpretations of religion, everybody seems to be able to justify what they want to do somehow. How can you tell who is right and wrong?

A: Let's say you have a store full of guns. If you put a peaceful person in there, he'd look at it all as a novelty, leaving the things on the walls and probably use one of the knives to chop an onion or radish for his breakfast with some fool (fava beans) or something like that. If you get somebody in there who is a trouble maker and wishes damage, he'd start using the machete's and guns for all sorts of trouble. He probably wouldn't even need to enter the store to start causing trouble. History is full of men like that.

A: Basically, yes. Some people would justify their violence using sayings and quotes from religion. Technically they may even be right, but these people do not apply or understand the context of such sayings or quotes. That fatally undermines their position. If you look at these people, say..the Wahhabi's who are particularly that way inclined. They seem to take from the same set of "hard line" Islamic thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyah and others, ignoring centuries and thousands of what I would refer to as the Islamic thinkers (Ibn Taymiyah and his ilk are actually the odd ones out who practice radical Islam) whom people would now refer to as "moderate".


OK that's it, I'm tired and going to bed now.

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Is the grass always greener?

I can remember clearly the lazy Friday afternoons when I would dream about going abroad to chase my dreams, education and get away from all this..this! This feeling of helplessness and lack of any use. The shortage of money, the headaches. Everything there seemed so new and fresh, seductive even. A whole world to experience and discover, yet I was still here...wasting my life and not doing anything. Fast forward 9 years and now I'm here - but the freshness is gone. The hardships of getting yourself established in this strange land overcome and fast fading into the past, the mystery now uncovered becomes mundane. It's like dreaming about meeting a famous celebrity or personality all your life and when you finally do, you realise they are mean, shorter and just human. Why has it taken a journey of thousands of miles and countless hardships to discover something which was always in front of you?

My friends now tell me that I see back there, with rose-tinted glasses. Perhaps, but this is not any nostalgia where I selectively remember all the good and embellish it even further in the recesses of my mind. This will be a plunge straight back into the madness of it, those hot polluted streets in mid-afternoon, crazy drivers and ridiculous political propaganda. Somewhere inside there are those good things which made me ignore all that in the past. There are the things I never had time to do when I was there, or couldn't be bothered with. The people I couldn't stand seeing. Yet I would happily suckle from that teat of home till I can suckle no more. Then as I lie there, sated and content soaking in that lazy Friday afternoon, I'll instantly burst up in activity and frenzy; thinking up more things I could do which I never thought of when I was here those 9 years ago! You can only be physically free once you break the shackles surrounding your mind - here and there are states of mind.

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The Dabke: from al-Zaytoona Dabke Group website

"DABKE is the national dance of Palestine and is often seen in festivals, celebrations and weddings. Originally, the inhabitants of the Levant used to live in houses built from stones with roofs made out of wood, straw and dirt. Each time, before it rained, the roof was supposed to be compacted, and this used to be done with a rolling stone, or mahdaleh. But before the mahdaleh, they use to compact it with their feet which required many strong men stomping the dirt hard in a uniform way that would compact it evenly. This event of cooperation is called ta'awon and from here comes the word awneh, meaning "help." This developed into the song 'Ala Dalouna', or roughly translated "Let's go and help". Therefore, the dabke and the rythmic songs go together in an attempt to keep the work fun and useful. Eventually, musicians would play for them so that the roof was stamped down in a homogeneous way, sealing all the cracks and compacting the dirt, making the water flow down the roof without going inside the house. "

Since the British occupation in Palestine in 1917, DABKE became a representation of Palestinian identity and was associated with political and national aspirations after the disaster of 1948 when the state of Israel was declared and hundred of thousands of Palestinians were deported from their land. Since then DABKE became the national dance of Palestinians and was emphasized more in refugee camps both in Gaza and the West Bank and in the Diaspora." Taken off of the al-Zaytouna Dabke Group website.

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Muthafar al Nawab

أتشهّى كل القطط الوسخة في الغربة

لكل نساء الغربة أسماكٌ

تحمل رائحة الثلج

وأتعبني جسدي

يا أيَّ امرأة في الليل!

تداس كسلة تمر بالأقدام

تعالي!

فلكل امرأة جسدي

وتدٌ عربي للثورة ، يا أنثى جسدي

كل الصديقين وكل زناة التاريخ العربي

هنا أرثٌ في جسدي

أضحك ممن يغريني بالسرج

وهل يسرج في الصبح حصان وحشيٌّ

ورث الجبهة من معركة "اليرموك"

وعيناه "الحيرة"

والأنهار تحارب في جسدي !؟

قد أعشق ألف امرأة في ذات اللحظة،

لكني أعشق وجه امرأة واحدة

في تلك اللحظة

امرأة تحمل خبزاً ودموعاً من بلدي

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'Pilgrims going to Mecca' by Leon Belly, French. Oil, 1861.

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"Cheap arguments" and the real debate..

Phyllis Chesler wrote in The Times about how her "eyes were opened to the barbarity of Islam". I started reading it and thinking, indeed how barbaric this Islamic religion is, look what they do to their women or how they force people to think and act in the same way. I don't want anything to do with them or their barbarity. Then I remembered that I am myself a Muslim and I had never experienced, nor seen the kind of horror story she was describing except perhaps in Saudi Arabia, that bastion of "moderate" Middle Eastern countries which the United States, Britain and Israel love so much. What is she talking about and why? What are her motives? It's becoming quite popular to construct these ridiculous and stupid generalizations in order to generate controversy and of course much needed revenue from book sales and appearances. Just read about people such as Wafa Sultan and Ayan Hirsi Ali, far from being respectable authorities and fighters for womens rights, I view these people as opportunistic individuals who have prostituted their ideas on the altar of this insane "Clash of Civilizations" temple.

Meanwhile Dr Buthaina Shaaban, somebody I deeply respect, highlights issues which people like Chesler don't have the intellectual integrity to address or even examine:

"No one seems to have the moral courage to condemn loudly the practices of Israeli and American occupations against women in Palestine and Iraq, or even to highlight the disconcerting suffering of women prisoners, women who lost their loved ones and women who were raped and humiliated. Let's imagine for a moment that these women in Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon had a different, perhaps Western nationality what would have happened on the women's international day? their stories would have become the only stories of that day." Incidentally the article is in the pro-Saudi establishment paper al Sharq al Awsat, but well worth a read.

I'm starting to take more and more of an interest on the situation of women in the Arab and Islamic worlds and I'm actively seeking information on personalities about whom I could read about past and present. I know that the cheap debates such as that by Phyllis Chesler in the earlier paragraph are not what is on Muslim and Arab womens minds, but because I've never focused on this area, I'm missing a clear understanding of what is. I guess questioning is always the start.

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Ghawar Kasak ya watan Gawar

This weeks pick off of Youtube posted by Naimosman. Kassak ya Watan was one of those classic plays which criticized the internal situation of the Arab countries. Duraid Laham landed himself a brief stay in prison for it and I hear that even the late Syrian President Assad (somebody please confirm) had watched it. The humour is intelligent, sarcastic and in many ways, sadly true till today.

In this scene, Ghawar talks to his father the "Martyr". Giving him an update on the state of the Arab world, Palestine, political freedoms and justice. Enjoy this classic scene..

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Dick Cheney announced that any withdrawal of US troops from Iraq will spell the end of the "moderate" Arab countries in the region, reports al-Jazeera(Arabic).

Withdraw US troops from Iraq NOW.

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The 33-Day war

Yesterday I finally visited the Saqi publishers book shop in Westbourne Grove, London. I'd passed by it a number of times over the years but kept putting off a visit there. As soon as I walked in I knew I was home, there were shelves and shelves of books on all aspects of politics, philosophy and history. Most importantly a large number of them dealt with the Middle East, I was like a kid in Hamley's on Christmas day. In spite of that, I tried to stay focused on looking for books relevant for my dissertation subject, but found that I had already read or borrowed all the ones recommended. I did however, find an interesting booklet that has just come out called "The 33-Day War" by Gilbert Achcar and Michel Warschawski.



I haven't finished reading it but I did feel a bit of anxiety in the introduction. The two writers come from Lebanon and Israel respectively and the book was supposed to offer two sides to the story, though Warschawski only wrote chapter 4. It was the fact that their friendship was "..based on their common dedication to the motto of the French Revolution that they learned in school as part of the French education that they share:"Liberty, Equality, Brotherhood" which made me worry I'd just brought a book by some March 14th enthusiast pining over his "Paris of the Orient". So far that is not the case however, and Achcar has mentioned something which I had not thought of before:

During the preceding quarter of a century, Islamic fundamentalism had been the favorite ideological weapon of reactionary forces led by Washington in the Muslim world. These were led by the Saudi kingdom, with its fiercely rigorist and obscurantist regime based on Wahhabism, the crudest version of Islamic fundamentalism. What appeared here [the Iranian revolution] quite suddenly was a highly impressive manifestation of another brand of Islamic fundamentalism, one that set itself up as the bearer of radical opposition to the West.

(Achcar and Warschawski, 2007: 32)

What he is saying is that here is another reason for the Saudi's to feel anxious about Iran. Obviously the fact it is Shia is one aspect, but that it has also articulated a policy for the region seperate to and opposed to their (American and Saudi) sponsored vision of the Middle East is the main one. The more I read, the more I realise many of these Wahhabi groups do indeed operate with Saudi blessings. Saudi Arabia is itself the leading client state for the United States in the region after Israel (I guess) and it leaves me wondering....

**Update**
I've just finished reading this booklet and it is actually excellent. It provides a meaningful insight into events occuring both in Lebanon and Israel, showing the restraints and influences on both parties. It's also give very interesting critiques of matters to do with the wider contexts that conflicts in the region are experiencing, from the clash of civilizations perspective, the neo-liberal economic agenda and the effect on the United States, and the situation in the region following the conflict. If you are free one afternoon and wish to read a no frills and insightful analysis of what happened last year in Lebanon, you can do no wrong in reading this book.

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نزار قباني

قارئة الفنجان

جَلَسَت والخوفُ بعينيها

تتأمَّلُ فنجاني المقلوب

قالت:

يا ولدي.. لا تَحزَن

فالحُبُّ عَليكَ هوَ المكتوب

يا ولدي،

قد ماتَ شهيداً

من ماتَ على دينِ المحبوب

فنجانك دنيا مرعبةٌ

وحياتُكَ أسفارٌ وحروب..

ستُحِبُّ كثيراً يا ولدي..

وتموتُ كثيراً يا ولدي

وستعشقُ كُلَّ نساءِ الأرض..

وتَرجِعُ كالملكِ المغلوب

بحياتك يا ولدي امرأةٌ

عيناها، سبحانَ المعبود

فمُها مرسومٌ كالعنقود

ضحكتُها موسيقى و ورود

لكنَّ سماءكَ ممطرةٌ..

وطريقكَ مسدودٌ.. مسدود

فحبيبةُ قلبكَ.. يا ولدي

نائمةٌ في قصرٍ مرصود

والقصرُ كبيرٌ يا ولدي

وكلابٌ تحرسُهُ.. وجنود

وأميرةُ قلبكَ نائمةٌ..

من يدخُلُ حُجرتها مفقود..

من يطلبُ يَدَها..

من يَدنو من سورِ حديقتها.. مفقود

من حاولَ فكَّ ضفائرها..

يا ولدي..

مفقودٌ.. مفقود

بصَّرتُ.. ونجَّمت كثيراً

لكنّي.. لم أقرأ أبداً

فنجاناً يشبهُ فنجانك

لم أعرف أبداً يا ولدي..

أحزاناً تشبهُ أحزانك

مقدُورُكَ.. أن تمشي أبداً

في الحُبِّ .. على حدِّ الخنجر

وتَظلَّ وحيداً كالأصداف

وتظلَّ حزيناً كالصفصاف

مقدوركَ أن تمضي أبداً..

في بحرِ الحُبِّ بغيرِ قُلوع

وتُحبُّ ملايينَ المَرَّاتِ...

وترجعُ كالملكِ المخلوع..

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Jihad: the basics

OK here it is. The sub chapter in my dissertation dealing with Jihad, though specifically from the Shia perspective of Hezbullah. There is a lot which due to space considerations I didn't include, as well as the fact that this is still a draft, but I'm hoping to have captured the essence of what Jihad is. Anyhow, for those of you who care, here is...Jihad: the basics:

Note: Any comments or recommendations are most welcome! Including on whether it stands up to academic scrutiny!

Jihad

In this section we examine the nature of Jihad as understood by Shia Muslims and applied by Hezbullah. Jihad (meaning to strive or struggle) is perhaps the most misinterpreted and controversial of Islamic concepts and is the second of Hezbullah's intellectual and ideological foundations. As mentioned previously, Hezbullah adheres first and foremost to the Shia Islamic interpretation of Islam as was articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. The totality of Islamic faith expressed in it's fullest by many Muslims, especially those Shia enrolled directly in Hezbullah, is based on the direct and active link that the worshiper has with Allah. This link provides a conviction and in times of difficulty, an inner strength which can help sustain a Muslim's endurance to hardship, oppression or fear. Jihad in itself can be expressed in two forms: firstly a “Lesser Jihad” which involves a limited engagement or war for the sake of Allah and the “Greater Jihad” of the soul, which is the Muslim's never ending and very human struggle against his base instincts that might weaken his faith in Allah¹.

The concept of Jihad, as Sheikh Naim Qassem points out, is probably best understood within the specific world view associated with Islam and based on Islamic assumptions though there are considerable parallels with notions of Christian suffering (I know, I need a reference here!). This world is seen as a temporary abode in which man is tested with hardship and tribulations, the nature and purpose of which mankind may be ill equipped or not able to comprehend readily². Mankind may either endure the misfortune and hardship, striving towards God, or blaspheme and divert from justice and righteousness, treating this world as the end all and be all of existence. It is only with the achievement of some mastery in “Greater Jihad” control of the self, it's wants and desires, is an individual truly capable of waging the “Lesser Jihad”, resisting oppressors and occupation. Sheikh Qassem portrays the choice that Muslim's have with regards to Jihad (Lesser or Greater) as quite clear, with the rewards either immediately apparent or in Paradise in the presence of Allah. These can be manifested in the inner calm, peace, and proximity to God that can be achieved when one defeats his or her “inner demons”, to the liberation of lands, livelihoods and people from oppressive occupation and humiliation, thus regaining the opportunity to live as Muslims free from harassment³.

There is however a fundamental difference in the interpretation of Jihad as expressed by Hezbullah on the one hand, and Sunnite Wahhabi groups such as al-Qaeda on the other. Sunni Islamist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb express the view that offensive war against the perceived enemies of Islam within the framework provided in the Quran is legitimate and necessary when required⁴, this more aggressive application of the Lesser Jihad is not shared by Shia clerics who divide Jihad into two main forms: Groundwork Jihad and Defensive Jihad⁵. Groundwork Jihad was only allowable under the Prophet Muhammad and his descendants up till the twelfth Imam. This was due to their infallibility in interpretation of the Law. In the absence of this infallible judgement, this form of Jihad is not an option until the return of the hidden Twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi. Hezbullah, through their adherence to the Law as presented by al-Wali al-Faqih, only subscribe to Defensive Jihad, that is, “the defence of Muslims of their land, their people or their own selves upon facing aggression or occupation.”⁶ and any discourse or reference to the term is to be taken as referring to this particular interpretation.

Another important point about Jihad, and one which Sheikh Qassem is quite clear about, is we must not equate Martyrdom in the Islamic sense with suicide:

Martyrdom is a voluntary act undertaken by a person who has all the reasons to live, love life, and cling to it, and also possesses the means for living. It is thus an act of one who does not suffer from any reasons compelling him to commit suicide⁷.

The expression of Jihad as we understood it earlier is an acceptance and patience in enduring the trials and tribulations of this world, placed on us by Allah. Thus waging Jihad against aggressors to Islam in spite of the dangers and hardship experienced is the ultimate expression of submission to the will of Allah, whereas suicide becomes the ultimate expression of surrender and despair, a quality expected perhaps of weaker individuals with no faith in the one Allah, but not for Muslim's who understand Jihad in all it's dimensions and expressions⁸. Martyrdom for a Muslim while performing Jihad becomes the ultimate price that has been paid, to which the reward and status in Islam is unmatched.

1Qassem, 2005: 34-35

2Ibid. 36-39

3Ibid.

4Qutb, 2000: 226

5Qassem, 2005: 39

6Ibid. (Note: Hezbullah's relationship with the United States and Israel is examined more closely in a later chapter in this dissertation)

7Qassem, 2005: 47

8Ibid.

Bibliography

Qassem, N. (2005). Hizbullah: The story from Within, Saqi, London

Qutb, S. (2000), “War, Peace, and Islamic Jihad”, in, Moaddel, M. and Talattof, K. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Islam: An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought, Macmillan Press ltd., Hampshire and London

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Translation of al Jazeera article by Michel Shahadeh

تعتمد نظرية برنارد لويس على فرضية أن الغرب المدعو بالعالم المسيحي يمر في آخر عصر من مراحل الصراع على السيطرة والهيبة بينه وبين الحضارة الإسلامية.

برنادرد لويس هو الذي صاغ مقولة "صراع الحضارات". وصرح لويس في إحدى المقابلات في الربيع الماضي مع (مايكل هيرش) من مجلة نيوزويك بأن "أحداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر/أيلول شكلت الطلقة الأولى في المعركة النهائية في هذه الحرب الحضارية الطويلة." وأضاف أن الذي سينتصر في هذه المعركة سينتصر تاريخيا.

كان لويس من أول المتحمسين لغزو العراق بعد أحداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر/أيلول، حيث كتب مقالات في الصحف مشجعاً على ذلك الغزو. وكان من أكثر الأكاديميين تأثيرا على صناع القرار مثل نائب الرئيس الأميركي ديك تشيني وولفويتز اللذين استعملا تعابير برنارد لويس بشكل دائم مثل تكرار ولفويتز لمقولة "أن تركيا هي أفضل نموذج سياسي للشرق الأوسط".

ومن الواضح أن عامة العرب والمسلمين لا يشاركون لويس نظرته هذه عن "صراع الحضارات" بل إنهم يرون أن التاريخ في معظمه يعبر عن تعايش وتبادل حضاري بين الحضارتين، لكنهم لم يترددوا في الدفاع عن النفس عندما هاجمهم الغرب في الماضي.

وهم يشعرون الآن بحجم الهجمة الغربية على المنطقة العربية وعلى الحضارة العربية ويعملون على حماية النفس والدفاع عنها، وهذا حق مشروع يختلف عن طرح مقولة لويس العدائية القائلة بأبدية الصراع بين الحضارتين، وعدائه للإسلام

My own translation of a section of Shahadeh's article (click here for the full Arabic text):

Bernard Lewis' theory is based on the assumption that the "West" which he refers to as the "Christian world", is in the last phase of an epochal struggle for domination between it and "Islamic civilization".

It is Bernard Lewis who originally coined the phrase "Clash of civilizations". Lewis stated in an interview with Michael Hersh (from Newsweek) last spring that "the events of September 11th represented the first shots of this final civilizational battle", adding that the victor of this battle will be the historic victor of this clash.

Lewis was a strong supporter of the Iraq invasion in 2003, writing a number of articles encouraging the invasion. He was also the most influential academic on top decision makers in Washington such as Vice President Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz who made numerous references to Lewis's statements such as "Turkey is the best model for the Middle East".

It is clear that the vast majority of Muslims and Arabs in the Middle East do not share Lewis' view of a "Clash of Civilizations" seeing history mostly as a co-existence and exchange between various cultures and civilizations, though they have not hesitated to defend themselves when the West attacked them in the past.

They are now particularly aware of the enormity of the West's assault on the area of the Arab world and on Arab civilization in particular, and are working to defend themselves. This is a legitimate right they are entitled to and therefore unrelated to Bernard Lewis' aggressive statements concerning the unending clash between the two civilizations, and his own apparent hostility to Islam.

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"The Farewell of King Boabdil at Granada" by Alfred Dehodencq (French Orientalist painter 1822-1882)

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"The other 1492" from Saudi Aramco World

"Al-Andalus is remembered on another level as the one area that was once - but is no longer - part of the Muslim world. Until the middle of this cen­tury, Muslims have withstood Mongols, Crusaders, empire-builders and settlers and still emerged with their Islamic identity intact - except in Spain. Even the Communist regimes of present-day China and the former Soviet Union failed to root out Islam, failed to deracinate their Muslim populations, despite vast expenditures of time, of treasure and of blood in attempts to build "the new socialist man" (See Aramco World, January-February 1990). The fact that the rest of the Muslim world has retained its religious identity over some fourteen centuries rife with political, social, cultural and technological change makes the exception of Spain that much more painful to Muslims."

I know it's from Saudi Aramco, but they do write some interesting articles sometimes!

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